THE YEAR 1981 proved to be more difficult and costly than the one preceding it for the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan. The position of the Soviets and their surrogate government under Babrak Karmal worsened precipitously during the year. As the Afghan people's civil and armed resistance grew in effectiveness, the Soviets and the Karmal government could not rightly claim any notable degree of popular support and justify their assertion that the estimated 85,000 Soviet troops were in Afghanistan only to defend the country against "imperialist aggression" backed by the United States, China, Pakistan, and Egypt. By the end of the year, the opposition forces (Mujaheedin) controlled most of the countryside and several important towns, and operated widely in many major cities, including Kabul, which was frequently isolated from the rest of the country. In fact, the Soviets and Karmalites appeared fairly desperate in their struggle to maintain even their initial hold on Kabul and some other main cities, notably Kandahar. Despite their heavy human and material sacrifice, however, the opposition forces were not in a position to achieve total victory and a military stalemate resulted. Yet, there was no sign of a political solution to the crisis either, for Moscow did not feel strong enough to sanction such a solution, as demanded by the international community, without losing all its influence in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the stalemate was reinforced by the apparent U.S. policy of favoring the continuation of the struggle in order to make the Soviet adventure as costly as possible, thereby discrediting Moscow internationally and restraining it in other trouble spots, especially Poland, El Salvador, and Iran, as well as exemplifying more assertive American foreign policy behavior. In its military intervention, starting openly in late December 1979,