
doi: 10.2307/2527218
Summary: When a large group of people is affected by a bargaining outcome, practical reasons often require that the group be represented by an agent in the bargaining. This paper addresses the issue of how the group ensures that the agent reaches an agreement that satisfies the group. We show that by adopting a super-majority ratification rule, the group may improve its bargaining position and obtain a larger share of the bargaining surplus. However, a super-majority ratification rule also involves the risk that a beneficial agreement is rejected by a minority of the group.
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, super-majority ratification rule, Other game-theoretic models, Cooperative games, Voting theory, bargaining, Group preferences
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, super-majority ratification rule, Other game-theoretic models, Cooperative games, Voting theory, bargaining, Group preferences
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