When the League of Nations, following the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and French Prime Minister Louis Barthou, took up in 1934 the question of defining more precisely the rules of international law concerning the repression of terrorist activity, its committee of experts drew up and a conference adopted on November 16, 1937 two Conventions, one for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and another for the Creation of an International Criminal Court.1 The fact that only one state—India—ratified the former and none ratified the latter is not a conclusive argument against the soundness of the League approach which was thorough and coherent,2 concerned with both the substantive law and its impartial and uniform application by an international tribunal. A High Contracting Party to the Convention was entitled to commit the accused for trial to the International Criminal Court if it did not wish to try them before its own courts or to grant extradition in accordance with the principle aut dedere aut judicare