
doi: 10.2307/2171924
Summary: Typically, work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable. This paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem. It is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets. A class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of ``integration by parts''. In such cases the optimal tariff is cost-based.
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, multiproduct nonlinear pricing, Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets), mechanism design, private information
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, multiproduct nonlinear pricing, Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets), mechanism design, private information
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 322 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 1% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 1% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
