During the last week of June, 1950, the President of the United States committed the armed forces of this country to belligerent action in Korea. This was the first significant implementation of the Truman Doctrine' since its promulgation four years ago. The President's decision was ratified by Congress and the United Nations, and even such professional critics of administration foreign policy in the Far East as Senator Robert A. Taft gave their blessings, albeit muttering incantations of an incongruous nature concerning the usurpation of Congressional prerogatives and "too little and too late" in the same breath. There was ample precedent in both constitutional practice2 and constitutional law3 for this fanning of the embers of the Cold War into a brighter glow. There may be weakness as well as strength in unity, however. The very equanimity, if not actual complacence, with which public opinion accepted such an invocation to what could be the first round of World War III should give us some pause for thought. Putting all question of the merits to one side, the implications of our present course of action are awesome to contemplate; the average citizen was as surprised by the sending of an American expeditionary force to fight in Asia as he had been five years previously when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. If the framing of foreign policy is to return to its historical locus as an inseparable prerogative of the Crown, how is responsibility to be maintained in a system of government which becomes increasingly divorced from the traditional patterns of popular control? A small but not insignificant facet of this problem of governance in a demo-