Three months of logomachy closed on April 4, 1951 when the Senate of the United States adopted S. Res. 99, confirming the Presidential interpretation, offered casually and with self-assurance at a press conference, of the scope of the Presidential constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief to send four additional divisions of American troops to Germany to help defend Western Europe, and, at the same time, politely requesting that the Chief Executive consult with the Senate and obtain "Congressional approval" before sending additional forces abroad in implementation of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus what the press had, with somewhat excessive exuberance and exacerbation, called "The Great Debate" came full circle and ended, not exactly as it began, but rather with the President's unimpeachable authority enhanced by the added sanction of Senatorial concurrence.1 It is by such means that we continue to build, as we have built increasingly during this century and especially during this past decade, the edifice of the office of our monolithic Executive, creating as we do so pressing and perplexing problems of responsibility and control; the President and the atomic bomb share an affinity in that we have demonstrated much greater ingenuity in organizing and creating instruments for the containment and release of macroscopic power than in institutionalizing patterns of social control to condition and regulate the exercise of such awesome force. His military status is but one of the constitutional facets of the Presidential office; even more important is the central figure of the Chief Executive as the general manager of the sprawling federal administrative structure. There has been an insistent trend in both theory and practice towards centralizing administrative power in the hands of the President, not only in the name of efficiency and economy, but also acting on the assumption that, if the control of bureaucracy is beyond the working capacities of the judiciary and the Congress, then perhaps we can