It may seem superogatory at this late date to undertake another critique of the analytical jurists. Yet the enterprise seems justified not only by the importance of the subject, but also by the circumstance that significant aspects of this juridical method and body of doctrine seem hitherto never to have been examined in their proper perspective. Analytical jurisprudence, whether in the undefiled Austinian form, in the numerous restatements of revisionists, or in the radical transmutations undergone at the hands of Hohfeldians, "legal realists," or "scientific jurists," still looms large in legal theorizing. If we are to comprehend more adequately what remains of value in it and what must be discarded, the nature of its enduring contributions and of its mistakes and fallacies, further analysis of the orthodox theory of law and legal methodology appears a vital necessity. Two inquiries preface the discussion: What were the analytical jurists trying to do and why were they trying to do it? Second, how successfully did they accomplish their task and how worthwhile was its accomplishment?