Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Feb 1993 English Publisher:Oxford University Press (OUP)Journal:The Quarterly Journal of Economics, volume 108, pages 245-258 (issn: 0033-5533, eissn: 1531-4650,

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Authors: Anbarci, Nejat;

doi: 10.2307/2118502

Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution

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Abstract

The paper deals with a sequential (extended) model of bargaining between two persons. The players make their offers and counteroffers which are either accepted or vetoed by the partner. Then the development of the game tends either to cooperation or to the disagreement alternative of outcome. The main results characterize the unique outcome of any subgame as its perfect equilibrium and show that it converges to the `area monotonic solution'.

Related Organizations

State University of New York at Potsdam
United States
University of Buffalo
United States

Keywords

Cooperative games, area monotonic solution, bargaining, perfect equilibrium

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