Seniority in Legislatures

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Part of book or chapter of book 01 Dec 1992 English Publisher:Cambridge University Press (CUP)Journal:American Political Science Review, volume 86, pages 951-965 (issn: 0003-0554, eissn: 1537-5943,

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Authors: RICHARD D. MCKELVEY; RAYMOND RIEZMAN;

doi: 10.2307/1964347 , 10.1142/9789814390125_0012

Seniority in Legislatures

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Abstract

We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

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