Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Copyright policy )Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Revised. Original dated to March 1985. Presented at the 5th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Boston MA, August 1985. We thank participants of Caltech, UCSD and Rand Corporation Theory Workshops, Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps, and two referees for valuable comments. Sobel thanks Joe Farrell and Chris Harris for many conversations on related topic and the National Science Foundation for partial support under grant SES 84-08655. Published as Banks, Jeffrey S., and Joel Sobel. "Equilibrium selection in signaling games." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1987): 647-661.
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic signaling games based on rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a characterization of the set of stable equilibria [Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs. Examples are given which differentiate the predictions of these equilibrium concepts.
Submitted - sswp565_-_revised.pdf
- California Institute of Technology United States
equilibrium selection, game theory, Expected utility, 330, Cardinality, Defendants, sequential equilibria of signaling games, strategic stability, Divinity, Multistage and repeated games, divine equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Extensive form games, Nash equilibrium, Game theory, Divinity, Extensive form games, Banks, Probability distributions, Cardinality, Expected utility, Defendants, Utility functions, Probability distributions, Banks, Strategic stability, signaling, stable equilibria, Game theory, Utility functions
equilibrium selection, game theory, Expected utility, 330, Cardinality, Defendants, sequential equilibria of signaling games, strategic stability, Divinity, Multistage and repeated games, divine equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Extensive form games, Nash equilibrium, Game theory, Divinity, Extensive form games, Banks, Probability distributions, Cardinality, Expected utility, Defendants, Utility functions, Probability distributions, Banks, Strategic stability, signaling, stable equilibria, Game theory, Utility functions
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