
doi: 10.2307/1910993
This paper proposes a procedure for implementing efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations in an exchange economy, using the perfect equilibrium concept. This procedure is an extension of the ''divide and choose'' method in two ways: it is defined for more than two agents and the divider's advantage is removed by auctioning the role of divider among the agents. Thus, in contrast with other equilibrium concepts (Nash, dominant), the perfect one solves the efficiency-justice dilemma.
efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations, Applications of game theory, General equilibrium theory, divide and choose method, efficiency-justice dilemma, exchange economy, perfect equilibrium
efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations, Applications of game theory, General equilibrium theory, divide and choose method, efficiency-justice dilemma, exchange economy, perfect equilibrium
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