
doi: 10.2307/1885957
Summary: Suppose that the government maximizes a fixed social welfare function through the use of policy instruments. These instruments may be classical lump sum transfers of wealth or such second-best instruments as commodity taxes, income taxes, etc. Then under certain conditions the aggregate demand behavior for this economy will appear as though it were generated by a single representative consumer.
Social choice, taxation, Group preferences, fixed social welfare function, aggregate demand behavior
Social choice, taxation, Group preferences, fixed social welfare function, aggregate demand behavior
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