Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart' presents the Supreme Court's most strenuous disapproval of prior restraints on the press to date. Despite its concern for the first amendment rights of the press, however, the Court showed no such solicitude for the free speech rights of defendants and their attorneys. Instead, the two major opinions2 in Nebraska Press Association both contain unsupported, conclusory language suggesting that the special protection afforded the press might somehow be inapplicable to restraints against defendants and defense attorneys.3 The implication is that in order to secure their rights to fair trials defendants may have to sacrifice their first amendment rights in the process. That conclusion involves the assumption that a defendant's exercise of free speech is capable -of denying the state a fair trial. Even when the defendant has been the object of pervasive adverse publicity, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that reversal of a conviction on the ground that a fair trial has been denied is rarely required.4 Accordingly, a situation in which a defendant could generate publicity sufficient to prejudice the case against the prosecution scarcely can be imagined. More importantly, fears of defense-generated publicity ignore the fundamental purpose of many of the important constitutional guarantees: protecting the individual from the state, not the reverse. The sixth amendment is concerned explicitly with the fair trial rights of "the accused," and the fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to due process are