This paper aims to examine disclosure about listed companies’ executive remuneration, investigating particularly the rules and recommendations adopted in industrialized countries (European countries: France; German; Italy; Spain; United Kingdom; and non-European countries: Canada; Japan; Russia; United States) and to verify if effective communication behaviours adopted in Italy and in foreign countries by listed public utility companies match cognitive and evaluation stakeholders’ expectations and rules and existing specific recommendations. Disclosure of the remuneration is necessary to offer each stakeholder to understand if the amount of compensation paid and its composition is adequate to avoid potential excesses that could compromise the process of value generation by the enterprise. This is an important topic, considering also potential conflicts between form, structure and level of executive directors’ remuneration (fixed and variable elements, stock options, total estimated value of non-cash benefits, remuneration paid to directors in connection with the termination of his activities during that financial year, etc.) and corporate performance optimization in the long term.