
In this paper, we compare different characterizations of the tak¯aful organization. We propose two different characterizations with one being based on conventional firm theory from microeconomics (“corporate” takāful) and another being based on the mutual/cooperative insurance literature (“community” takāful). We find that both characterizations imply different strategies due to different objectives and operational conditions. We also find that if participants in a community takāful organization are altruistic, those overseeing the organization must make sure that participants do not spend more than they have when paying for claims made by the community.
altruism, adverse selection, Principal-agent models, Actuarial mathematics, mutual insurance, Welfare economics, \textit{takāful}, social welfare
altruism, adverse selection, Principal-agent models, Actuarial mathematics, mutual insurance, Welfare economics, \textit{takāful}, social welfare
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