Despite the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia continue to maintain their ICBMs and many SLBMs in a highly alerted state--they are technically prepared to launch the missiles within minutes of a command decision to do so. Some analysts argue that, particularly in light of the distressed condition of the Russian military, these high alert conditions are tantamount to standing on the edge of a nuclear cliff from which we should now step back. They have proposed various bilateral ''de-alerting'' measures, to be taken prior to and outside the context of the formal strategic arms reduction treaty (START) process. This paper identifies several criteria for a stable de-alerting regime, but fails to find de-alerting measures that convincingly satisfy the criteria. However, some de-alerting measures have promise as de-activation measures for systems due for elimination under the START II and prospective START III treaties. Moreover, once these systems are deactivated, a considerable part of the perceived need to keep nuclear forces on high alert as a survivability hedge will be reduced. At the same time, the U.S. and Russia could consider building on their earlier cooperative actions to reduce the risk of inadvertent nuclear war by enhancing theirmore » communications links and possibly joining in efforts to improve early warning systems.« less