
handle: 20.500.14332/5139
Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. Previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of ¯rms' pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, learning and forgetting are distinct economic forces. In particular, a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, market dominance, and multiple equilibria, whereas a model with learning alone cannot.
150399 Business and Management not elsewhere classified, dynamic games; learning-by-doing; organizational forgetting, Economics, Industrial Organization, FOS: Economics and business, Markov-perfect equilibrium, learning-by-doing, dynamic stochastic games, industry dynamics, multiple equilibria, organizational forgetting, jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:D43
150399 Business and Management not elsewhere classified, dynamic games; learning-by-doing; organizational forgetting, Economics, Industrial Organization, FOS: Economics and business, Markov-perfect equilibrium, learning-by-doing, dynamic stochastic games, industry dynamics, multiple equilibria, organizational forgetting, jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:D43
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