
handle: 11250/163863 , 11250/162710 , 10419/62467
We study how firm-specific complementary assets and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results show when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms protected weakly by complementary assets must sue leaving workers in order to obtain positive profits. Moreover, firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages and have lower turnover, but the higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Finally, our analysis suggests that strengthening firms' property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.
IPP, entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurship; Innovation; IPR; Litigation; Personnel economics; R&D; Start-ups, R & D, start-ups, entrepreneurship, innovation, intellectual property rights, litigation, personnel economics, R&D, start-ups, worker mobility, J30, intellectual property rights, Immaterialgüterrechte, Entrepreneurship; Innovation; IPP; Litigation; Personnel economics; R&D; Start-ups, R&D, ddc:330, VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213, litigation, Industrielle Forschung, innovation, Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte, worker mobility, Personalmanagement, personnel economics, Law, Theorie, J60, jel: jel:J60, jel: jel:E00, jel: jel:K41, jel: jel:M50, jel: jel:J30, jel: jel:M13, jel: jel:O32
IPP, entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurship; Innovation; IPR; Litigation; Personnel economics; R&D; Start-ups, R & D, start-ups, entrepreneurship, innovation, intellectual property rights, litigation, personnel economics, R&D, start-ups, worker mobility, J30, intellectual property rights, Immaterialgüterrechte, Entrepreneurship; Innovation; IPP; Litigation; Personnel economics; R&D; Start-ups, R&D, ddc:330, VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213, litigation, Industrielle Forschung, innovation, Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte, worker mobility, Personalmanagement, personnel economics, Law, Theorie, J60, jel: jel:J60, jel: jel:E00, jel: jel:K41, jel: jel:M50, jel: jel:J30, jel: jel:M13, jel: jel:O32
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 16 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
