
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.877902
handle: 10419/33550 , 10419/19127
We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.
L14, Klubtheorie, ddc:330, Rent Seeking, rent-seeking, Soziales Netzwerk, political parties, two-sided platforms, rent-seeking, network formation, D72, political parties, two-sided platforms, Politische Partei, Patronage, D85, network formation, Theorie
L14, Klubtheorie, ddc:330, Rent Seeking, rent-seeking, Soziales Netzwerk, political parties, two-sided platforms, rent-seeking, network formation, D72, political parties, two-sided platforms, Politische Partei, Patronage, D85, network formation, Theorie
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