
handle: 20.500.14332/1041
Abstract We examine the press’ role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Negative press coverage is more strongly related to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay, suggesting a sophisticated approach by the media in selecting CEOs to cover. However, negative coverage is also greater for CEOs with more option exercises, suggesting the press engages in some degree of “sensationalism.” We find little evidence that firms respond to negative press coverage by decreasing excess CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover.
Business and Corporate Communications, Finance and Financial Management, Accounting, media, corporate governance, press, Corporate Finance, executive compensation
Business and Corporate Communications, Finance and Financial Management, Accounting, media, corporate governance, press, Corporate Finance, executive compensation
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 687 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 0.1% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 1% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
