We study the effect of presenting unfeasible policies in an infinitely repeated game in which two parties compete for office. In each competitive period, parties choose whether to propose a feasible policy platform or an attractive but unfeasible one. If both parties choose the same type of platform, the election is decided according to exogenous baseline probabilities. If only one party lies, that party wins the election for sure, but is punished in future elections. The model captures the trade-off between the current electoral gain from dishonesty and the future cost of reputational dishonesty. We study stationary Nash equilibria and focus on two pure-strategy profiles: an honesty equilibrium, in which both parties always propose feasible policies, and a dishonesty equilibrium, in which both parties always propose unfeasible policies. Honesty can be sustained when parties are sufficiently patient and punishment is at least of two periods. Dishonesty can persist when parties are impatient or when the punishment phase is short. The analysis shows how the credibility of political promises depends on the interaction between electoral incentives, patience, and the severity of future punishment.