Federal Law No. 62-FZ of 23 March 2026 introduced into Russian insolvency law a rehabilitation procedure featuring the division of creditors into classes and a mechanism for cross-class confirmation of the plan (cross-class cram-down), aligning the Russian regime with the modern restructuring frameworks of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, India, and Japan. This paper analyses the reform not from the standpoint of the quality of the statutory text, but from the standpoint of the institutional preconditions required for it to operate in practice. Drawing on the comparative experience of six jurisdictions (1999-2021) and the economics-of-insolvency literature, it identifies three structural constraints on the Russian model: the absence of specialised insolvency courts, the unresolved question of the independence of insolvency administrators, and the dominance of state-affiliated creditors. Particular attention is paid to the risk of zombie lending, by analogy with Japan's experience in the 1990s, where a formally workable procedure failed to produce results because of the non-economic incentives of dominant creditors. The paper concludes with a projection of the likely distribution of the reform's effects and argues that its success will be determined not by the text of the law but by subsequent institution-building, which comparative evidence suggests requires at least a decade.