<p><span>Originalism, loosely defined, commands a majority on the Supreme Court and dominates legal discourse in a way that would have been unrecognizable a generation ago. Yet its actual constraining effect on judicial behavior remains doubtful. This Article offers two contributions to the long-running debate. First, it identifies a pathology in both originalist scholarship and practice that it terms "methodolatry"—a preoccupation with methodological refinement that threatens to elevate method over the purposes interpretation is meant to serve. Second, and more importantly, it argues that debates over interpretive method, however vigorous, fail to address the core problem. Text and history offer relatively weak resistance to a judge disposed, consciously or not, to reach a particular result. Instead, the more consequential constraints flow from institutional structures, professional expectations, and individual character. Invoking Karl Llewellyn's insight that no theory of constitutional law can substitute for adequate personnel, the Article urges greater attention to the identification, cultivation, and nurturing of judges who possess practical wisdom, intellectual humility, and the other attributes consistently endorsed in the literature on judicial character.</span></p>