<span>The New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant sustained a kinetic strike on 14 February 2025, compromising the airtight seal required for its 100-year design life. Preliminary assessments by the Novarka 2 consortium estimate a €500 million restoration cost, leaving a residual unfunded deficit of approximately €400 million across the contributor base. This paper argues that the persistent funding gap is structurally driven by a classic n-player coordination problem with free-rider incentives, rather than a lack of state fiscal capacity or engineering consensus. Each contributor state is rationally delaying its pledge because its expected sovereign liability under catastrophic non-funding scenarios remains opaque.</span> <br><span>To collapse this defection equilibrium, this paper introduces a five-part actuarial disclosure framework: (1) a stochastic Markov chain decay model mapping structural degradation post-breach; (2) a multi-sovereign expected-liability calculation; (3) a sovereign-credit transmission channel modeling how unmitigated environmental tail-risk reprices into borrowing costs via CDS spreads; (4) a public disclosure mechanism designed to dissolve information asymmetry for credit rating agencies and debt markets; and (5) a red-team risk register. The framework demonstrates that simultaneously publishing this actuarial reality forces ordinary credit-research mechanisms to price the tail-risk, mathematically rendering the funding pledge a strictly dominant strategy for donor finance ministries.</span>