A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement
Copyright policy )A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement
Abstract The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF’s objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan’s dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Lear’s dilemma.
- Bank for International Settlements Switzerland
- George Washington University United States
- International Monetary Fund United States
Samaritan?s dilemma, IMF, coinsurance arrangement, conditionality, moral hazard, Samaritan's dilemma, King Lear's dilemma, Social Sciences, H, Internationale Kreditvergabe, F33, IMF,coinsurance arrangement,moral hazard,Samaritan?s dilemma,King Lear?s dilemma, IMF, HB71-74, Moral Hazard, Samaritan´s dilemma, ddc:330, Conditionality;Moral hazard;IMF;coinsurance arrangement, Samaritan’s dilemma, King Lear's dilemma, coinsurance, repayment, debt, interest, Asymmetric and Private Information, International Economic Order, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions,, IMF,coinsurance arrangement,moral hazard,Samaritan´s dilemma,King Lear´s dilemma, coinsurance arrangement, moral hazard, D82, Economics as a science, Anpassungsprogramm des IWF, Versicherungsökonomik, G22, F02, King Lear´s dilemma, King Lear?s dilemma, Theorie, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:F02, jel: jel:G22, jel: jel:F33
Samaritan?s dilemma, IMF, coinsurance arrangement, conditionality, moral hazard, Samaritan's dilemma, King Lear's dilemma, Social Sciences, H, Internationale Kreditvergabe, F33, IMF,coinsurance arrangement,moral hazard,Samaritan?s dilemma,King Lear?s dilemma, IMF, HB71-74, Moral Hazard, Samaritan´s dilemma, ddc:330, Conditionality;Moral hazard;IMF;coinsurance arrangement, Samaritan’s dilemma, King Lear's dilemma, coinsurance, repayment, debt, interest, Asymmetric and Private Information, International Economic Order, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions,, IMF,coinsurance arrangement,moral hazard,Samaritan´s dilemma,King Lear´s dilemma, coinsurance arrangement, moral hazard, D82, Economics as a science, Anpassungsprogramm des IWF, Versicherungsökonomik, G22, F02, King Lear´s dilemma, King Lear?s dilemma, Theorie, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:F02, jel: jel:G22, jel: jel:F33
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