
arXiv: 2410.05533
Information designers, such as online platforms, often do not know the beliefs of their receivers. We design learning algorithms so that the information designer can learn the receiver's prior through repeated interactions. Our learning algorithms achieve no regret relative to optimality for the known prior at a fast speed, achieving a tight regret bound $\Theta(\log T)$ in general and a tight regret bound $\Theta(\log \log T)$ in the important special case of two actions.
Computer Science and Game Theory, Machine Learning, FOS: Computer and information sciences, FOS: Economics and business, Data Structures and Algorithms, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS), Theoretical Economics, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT), Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Computer Science and Game Theory, Machine Learning, FOS: Computer and information sciences, FOS: Economics and business, Data Structures and Algorithms, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS), Theoretical Economics, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT), Machine Learning (cs.LG)
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