It is a well-acknowledged fact that a single token can bear different meanings. It is also well known that the same line of reasoning can be applied to illocutionary acts. For instance, the illocutionary act of saying ”It is going to rain” might function as either an assertion or a warning, depending on the context.However, we may ask ourselves whether the same utterance could instantiate both kinds of acts. That is, could it be the case that when Sarah says to Irene, ”It is going to rain,” both an assertion and a warning occur, such that one act does not exclude the other? And if so, what kind of relation exists between them? Furthermore, we might wonder whether, in the case of certain illocutionary acts, another illocutionary act must occur as a proper part of them. A promise, for example, can only occur if it is accepted, and the act of acceptance seems to be an illocutionary act too.In this essay, I attempt to answer these questions. My specific aim is to outline a schema of the different ways in which illocutionary acts stand in relations of dependence and even compose with one another. The result will be a framework in which certain kinds of illocutionary acts are shown to be dependent on others for their existence, exhibiting different types of dependence relations. I will argue that these findings may help us understand the evolution of communication and open further research avenues.