This paper investigates the extent to which free trade agreements mitigate the adverse commercial effects of geopolitical friction in critical raw material markets. Using a multi-product structural gravity model augmented with an interaction term, we analyze a comprehensive panel dataset of annual bilateral trade data covering 30 distinct critical raw materials across 233 countries from 1995 to 2021. Our empirical estimations rely on the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator and reveal that these commodities fundamentally deviate from standard trade expectations. First, highly concentrated critical raw materials initially exhibit strategic stockpiling, where diplomatic friction increases bilateral trade volumes. Second, while formal trade agreements act as an institutional shield against this volatility, their effectiveness is strictly conditional on market structure. For materials reliant on long-term contracts, strategic dependency is a chronic feature, and trade agreements provide durable protection across consecutive years. Conversely, for materials lacking long-term contracting structures, the initial stockpiling is a temporary response that reverses into significant trade reductions within a one-year lag, rendering formal trade agreements statistically ineffective. By systematically quantifying this temporal resilience channel, our study demonstrates that while trade agreements are important instruments for geoeconomic security, they are structurally insufficient for the most concentrated ores, highlighting the need for alternative sovereignty strategies such as domestic recycling and innovation.