When a corporation commits a crime, prosecutors, judges, and managers must decide how to prevent the offense from recurring. The familiar approach is to implement what this article calls "targeted compliance," i.e. policies and procedures that directly address whatever institutional vulnerability allowed the crime to occur. Targeted compliance has, at best, a mixed track record.&nbsp; <br><br>This Article introduces, theorizes, and tests a different approach--"side-channel compliance." Rather than target the institutional source of crime directly, side-channel compliance works by raising the general salience of a possibly unrelated prosocial value (like ecological stewardship, gender equality, or fair trade) within the workplace and the firm's corporate identity. Drawing on business ethics, marketing science, and organizational psychology, the Article offers multiple theoretical frameworks to motivate side-channel compliance. It then makes the empirical case that side-channel compliance works using an original, hand-collected dataset of 1,673 measurements of sociality for corporate criminals over a ten-year span. The data show that worse scores predict future criminality. Side-channel compliance offers exciting new possibilities for how legal authorities and business managers approach compliance, both before and after crime occurs.