Electoral neutrality is frequently treated as an administrative or procedural concern, reducible to polling-day conduct and the technical competence of electoral management bodies. This paper rejects that narrow framing and instead conceptualizes electoral neutrality as a structural and constitutional question grounded in power, institutional design, and human rights. Using Uganda as a case study, and engaging constitutional provisions, electoral legislation, international and regional human rights treaties, and Supreme Court jurisprudence, the paper argues that where an incumbent executive remains in office throughout the electoral cycle while retaining decisive appointment authority over electoral institutions and security forces, neutrality becomes largely illusory. Executive dominance constitutionalizes incumbency advantage and normalizes elections that are formally lawful yet substantively compromised. The paper concludes that without a redistribution of executive power and a reconfiguration of appointment regimes, electoral processes may satisfy procedural legality while violating the deeper human rights norms of political equality, participation, and democratic selfdetermination.