Abstract This Article develops the concept of procedurally forced distributive discourse, and articulates its values for a legitimate, well-functioning democracy. In classical Athens, citizens dissatisfied with their assigned tax burden could dispute it under the exchange procedure (antidosis). Under an antidosis, the taxpayer challenged another citizen to take over his tax burden or completely swap their real and personal property entitlements. Should the challenged party refuse, the assignee-taxpayer appealed to the courts, and juries would assign the tax burden to the party deemed wealthier after hearing speeches from both. I argue that the antidosis procedure was not only designed to ensure tax equity within the Athenian propertied class. It also forced the wealthy to speak directly to the public, generated pressure to support progressive distribution in political rhetoric, and illuminated the methods of capital accumulation. Its operation shows the potential of tax procedure to enrich distributive speech, in the process advancing transparency goals and debiasing the public. This Article’s comparative analysis thus prompts us to rethink the relationship among democracy, discourse, and distribution.