
arXiv: 2506.12416
Alice wishes to reveal the state $X$ to Bob, if he knows some other information $Y$ also known to her. If Bob does not, she wishes to reveal nothing about $X$ at all. When can Alice accomplish this? We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition on the joint distribution of $X$ and $Y$. Shannon's result on the perfect secrecy of the one-time pad follows as a special case.
Computer Science and Game Theory, FOS: Economics and business, FOS: Computer and information sciences, Information Theory (cs.IT), Information Theory, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), Theoretical Economics, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Computer Science and Game Theory, FOS: Economics and business, FOS: Computer and information sciences, Information Theory (cs.IT), Information Theory, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), Theoretical Economics, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
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