Published online: December 2024 Constitutional concepts are increasingly challenged because of their undemocratic provenance. Often, these concepts are constructed by (unelected) constitutional judges, thus denounced as lacking enough legitimacy and political entrenchment. The concept of constitutional identity belongs to this group. This article argues that constitutional identity in the European context has been erroneously subscribed to the sole authority of the domestic constitutional courts. It proposes to involve national legislatures and political bodies in the development of constitutional identity and to employ opt-outs and actions for annulment as mechanisms of dispersion of power over constitutional identity. First, the article shows that judicial constitutional identity discourse is just the latest iteration of a long-standing phenomenon of national courts’ resistance to the principle of primacy of EU law. Second, it is argued that in normative terms and given the historical reading of the clause, the concept invites diverse constitutional subjects–political actors, both domestic and transnational–to determine its content vis-à-vis European law. It was only a matter of practice that the identity clause was developed by the national constitutional courts. Third, the article depicts how the lack of guiding criteria and an elusive character of the constitutional identity concept led to the moderately successful development of the idea in the EU context, both formally and substantively. Formally, it becomes increasingly difficult to defend the constitutional court's power that establishes the limits to European law, as it incapacitates political institutions. Substantively, as the recent example of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal shows, these institutions are not immune to capture and can freely abuse constitutional concepts. It is claimed that the dispersion of authority over the identity clause would provide the concept with more democratic legitimacy and might help prevent future abuses by the captured constitutional courts. Fourth, the article proposes three ways to de-judicialize the concept of constitutional identity: the involvement of national legislatures, employment of action for annulment, and the use of opt-outs.