Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation
Copyright policy )Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation
In diesem Papier wird untersucht, welche Wirkung die ungleiche Reprasentation in einem Interessengruppensystem auf den Grad an Informationsubertragung zwischen einem Lobbyisten und einem Politiker hat. Es wird ein dynamisches Modell fur ‚Cheap-talk’ verwendet, in dem angenommen wird, dass der Lobbyist Wert auf seine Reputation als aufrichtiger Informationsvermittler legt. Dabei kann gezeigt werden, dass je groser die Ungleichheit im System, dem Politiker umso weniger Information glaubwurdig ubermittelt werden kann. Daruber hinaus wird die Wohlfahrtswirkung der Ungleichheit untersucht und diskutiert, welche Effekte solche Institutionen haben, die zwar einerseits die Transparenz erhohen, mit unerwunschtem Nebeneffekt aber den Anreiz fur Lobbyisten, Informationen wahrheitsgemas weiterzugeben, verringern.
- University of Copenhagen Denmark
- Swedish National Bank Sweden
theory formation, inequality, bias, Lobbying, representation, credibility, D72, Theoriebildung, D78, Political science, ddc:330, Politiker, Glaubwürdigkeit, reputation, interest groups, Interessenvertretung, D82, Lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, representation, inequality, bias, truth, Politikwissenschaft, Wahrheit, bias; inequality; information transmission; interest groups; lobbying; representation; reputation, decision making, politician, Entscheidungsfindung, basic research, Informationsvermittlung, political communication, Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture, Lobby, politische Kommunikation, Repräsentation, politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur, information transmission, lobby, representation of interests, information brokerage, lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, representation, inequality, bias, Grundlagenforschung, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D72, jel: jel:D78, jel: jel:D1, jel: jel:D2, jel: jel:D3, jel: jel:D4, jel: jel:D6, jel: jel:D7, jel: jel:H, ddc: ddc:320
theory formation, inequality, bias, Lobbying, representation, credibility, D72, Theoriebildung, D78, Political science, ddc:330, Politiker, Glaubwürdigkeit, reputation, interest groups, Interessenvertretung, D82, Lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, representation, inequality, bias, truth, Politikwissenschaft, Wahrheit, bias; inequality; information transmission; interest groups; lobbying; representation; reputation, decision making, politician, Entscheidungsfindung, basic research, Informationsvermittlung, political communication, Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture, Lobby, politische Kommunikation, Repräsentation, politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur, information transmission, lobby, representation of interests, information brokerage, lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, representation, inequality, bias, Grundlagenforschung, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D72, jel: jel:D78, jel: jel:D1, jel: jel:D2, jel: jel:D3, jel: jel:D4, jel: jel:D6, jel: jel:D7, jel: jel:H, ddc: ddc:320
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