Downloads provided by UsageCounts
handle: 10419/127227 , 10419/93758 , 10419/76585 , 10419/22869 , 2454/20675
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals' propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
Simulations, Test, Imitationswettbewerb, 330, Experimental studies, Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imita- tion; Cournot markets; Information; Experiments; Simulations, Evolutionary game theory, Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imitation; Cournot markets; Experiments, imitation, information, Stochastic stability, Experiment, C72, evolutionary game theory, stochastic stability, imitation, Cournot markets, experiments, Information, C91, C92, Evolutionary game theory, Stochastic stability, Imitation, Cournot markets, Experiments, Imita- tion, evolutionary game theory, Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imitation; Cournot markets; Information; Experiments; Simulations, L13, Evolutionary games, ddc:330, Evolutionäre Spieltheorie, Imitationsstrategie, experiments, stochastic stability, Cournot markets, evolutionary game theory, stochastic stability, imitation, Cournot, experiments, Imitation, simulations, Experiments, Duopol, D43, Theorie, jel: jel:D43, jel: jel:C92, jel: jel:C91, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:L13
Simulations, Test, Imitationswettbewerb, 330, Experimental studies, Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imita- tion; Cournot markets; Information; Experiments; Simulations, Evolutionary game theory, Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imitation; Cournot markets; Experiments, imitation, information, Stochastic stability, Experiment, C72, evolutionary game theory, stochastic stability, imitation, Cournot markets, experiments, Information, C91, C92, Evolutionary game theory, Stochastic stability, Imitation, Cournot markets, Experiments, Imita- tion, evolutionary game theory, Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imitation; Cournot markets; Information; Experiments; Simulations, L13, Evolutionary games, ddc:330, Evolutionäre Spieltheorie, Imitationsstrategie, experiments, stochastic stability, Cournot markets, evolutionary game theory, stochastic stability, imitation, Cournot, experiments, Imitation, simulations, Experiments, Duopol, D43, Theorie, jel: jel:D43, jel: jel:C92, jel: jel:C91, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:L13
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 177 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 1% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
| views | 16 | |
| downloads | 30 |

Views provided by UsageCounts
Downloads provided by UsageCounts