AbstractOne of the main moral costs of stare decisis lies in the continuous possibility of entrenching morally deficient decisions in the law. Although legal systems usually make provision for dealing with morally deficient precedents, there are cases in which the legal obligation of later courts to follow one of these precedents is undefeated. This possibility affects the overall justification of stare decisis. One traditional answer to this problem consists in accepting this moral cost, on the belief that the benefits of stare decisis outweigh it. On this view, when there is an undefeated legal obligation to follow a morally deficient precedent, the court must simply follow precedent. In this article, I question this approach and defend an alternative solution. I argue that, under some conditions, a court facing a morally deficient precedent should have the power to either follow the precedent or suspend its application to the parties by ordering a temporary stay of proceedings and referring the case to a higher court with power to overrule the precedent. This proposal entails exercising an equitable power recognised by the legal system, which I defend against three possible objections.