
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.413103
This essay is a new chapter in An Introduction to Law and Economics (Third Edition, forthcoming 2003). It reexamines some of the principles of liability from earlier chapters when harm is caused by an agent who is under the supervision of a principal. The primary questions addressed are: Is the optimal level of liability different when harm is caused by an agent of a principal rather than by a single actor? Should liability be imposed on the principal, the agent, or both? If on both, what is the optimal mix of liability between the principal and the agent?
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