Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
Copyright policy )Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
Cartel pricing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Balancing concerns about maintaining the stability of the cartel with those of avoiding detection, the cartel may either (i) gradually raise price to its steady-state level or (ii) gradually raise price and then have it decline to its steady-state level. Antitrust laws may have a perverse effect as they make cartel stability easier and thus allow for higher cartel prices.
- Johns Hopkins University United States
- Johns Hopkins University United States
- Department of Economics Switzerland
- JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY United States
- Department of Economics Indonesia
Antitrust, Konzentrationspolitik, ddc:330, L4, Collusion, Betriebliche Preispolitik, Cartel Detection, L1, Kartell, Verhandlungstheorie
Antitrust, Konzentrationspolitik, ddc:330, L4, Collusion, Betriebliche Preispolitik, Cartel Detection, L1, Kartell, Verhandlungstheorie
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