Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining
Copyright policy )Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining
In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.
- Economics Institute Czech Republic
- Czech Academy of Sciences Czech Republic
- Universität Hamburg Germany
- National Experimental University of the Armed Forces Venezuela
- Aarhus University Denmark
Technology, Economics and Econometrics, Public Administration, Economics, FOS: Political science, bargaining; gender differences; laboratory experiment, Experimental studies, Social Sciences, Quantum mechanics, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, H, Economic Analysis of Law and Legal Systems, Social Preferences and Economic Behavior, C91, C92, Microeconomics, Gender differences, Political science, C78, Gender Differences, J16, ddc:330, T, Physics, bargaining, laboratory experiment, Power (physics), Laboratory experiment, Labor Relations and Union Revitalization Studies, Economics, Econometrics and Finance, gender differences, Collective Bargaining, Bargaining power, Bargaining, D7, Safety Research
Technology, Economics and Econometrics, Public Administration, Economics, FOS: Political science, bargaining; gender differences; laboratory experiment, Experimental studies, Social Sciences, Quantum mechanics, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, H, Economic Analysis of Law and Legal Systems, Social Preferences and Economic Behavior, C91, C92, Microeconomics, Gender differences, Political science, C78, Gender Differences, J16, ddc:330, T, Physics, bargaining, laboratory experiment, Power (physics), Laboratory experiment, Labor Relations and Union Revitalization Studies, Economics, Econometrics and Finance, gender differences, Collective Bargaining, Bargaining power, Bargaining, D7, Safety Research
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