I study disclosure choices in job postings and the trade-off between two channels: detailed postings inform and attract optimal job applicants (i.e., a labor market channel) but could also inform competitors in labor and product markets (i.e., a proprietary costs channel). First, I provide evidence consistent with a proprietary costs channel: private firms and redacting firms are less specific in their postings, and postings are more often anonymous in industries with high levels of trade secrecy. Then, I exploit the introduction of federal trade secrecy protections (i.e., the Defend Trade Secrets Act, or DTSA) to assess the trade-off between the two channels. After the implementation of the DTSA, firms demand higher levels of skill in postings for innovative jobs, consistent with trade secrecy protections spurring innovative activities. However, job posting specificity decreases, in line with the proprietary costs channel, as trade secrecy protections are maximized when firms remain opaque regarding innovation. This decrease is attenuated for postings in tight labor markets, which is not only indicative of the importance of specificity in job postings, but also consistent with the proposed trade-off.