This paper investigates the relation between the presence of organized crime and the technology level in north Italy. Our analysis proposes two provincial indexes. The first portrays technology at a fine-grained industrial sector level. The second describes mafia-type organizations in line with the investigation approach currently used by Italian National Antimafia Directorate (DNA) and Antimafia District Directorates (DDAs). With these indexes, we provide empirical evidence that in north Italy, the larger the presence of organized crime, the less innovation and the technological level of the industrial fabric. Our reading of this finding is that without organized crime, Nature selects agents according to their capacity to innovate. Instead, with organized crime, agents can choose an alternative strategy: relate with organized crime, which hinders innovation. Modelling the interaction innovation - relation with mafias by evolutionary game theory, we show that the presence of organized crime, through natural selection, leads to low levels of technology. Our model also shows how to use sanctions and indemnities to address the problem.