
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.330700
This paper compares the Nash Bargaining Solution and market outcomes in a simple n person exchange economy. It shows how the two outcomes differ with respect to responsiveness of equilibrium to differences in the curvature of the utility function, in endowments, and in market positions.
jel: jel:C78
jel: jel:C78
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