
The court erred by: (1) assuming that that the characterization of the Amex service as a two-sided platform should fundamentally change the antitrust principles that govern the Amex restraints, (2) misunderstanding the nature of competition in two-sided markets, (3) placing the burden on plaintiffs to disprove that the harm from supracompetitive merchant fees are not outweighed by benefits to third parties (cardholders in this case), and most importantly (4) disregarding the critical antitrust issue – the impacts of the Amex merchant anti-steering and pricing restraints on competition among credit card platforms.
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 2 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
