Group-Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Job Matching with Continuous Transfers

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Other literature type 01 Jan 2018 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

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Authors: Jan Christoph Schlegel;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3157803

Group-Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Job Matching with Continuous Transfers

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Abstract

We show that several classical results (the existence of a worker-optimal stable allocation, the rural hospitals theorem, the group-strategy-proofness of the worker-optimal stable mechanism) extend from the discrete to the continuous case in a generalized job matching model.

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City St George’s, University of London
United Kingdom

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