This paper tests whether SEC registrants engage in opinion shopping and examines the role of audit committees when auditors are dismissed (1996-98). There are three main findings. First, companies strategically dismiss incumbent auditors if they are more likely to issue unfavorable audit opinions compared to newly appointed auditors. Using the methodology of Lennox (2000), it is estimated that opinion shopping motivates 17% of auditor dismissals. Opinion shopping dismissals are also found to occur significantly later in the fiscal year compared to other types of dismissals. Second, I use the level and change in meeting activity during the auditor dismissal year to investigate the extent to which committees participate in auditor dismissal decisions. It is estimated that 15% of audit committees do not participate in auditor dismissal decisions but opinion shopping is not significantly associated with participation. Third, Accounting Series Release No. 247 requires that companies disclose whether audit committees approve audit firm changes. After controlling for non-participation, I find audit committees are more likely to disapprove of auditor dismissals that are motivated by opinion shopping. However, independent audit committee members are more likely to leave committees that disapprove of opinion shopping.