Walrasian Bargaining

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Research , Report 01 Jan 2002 United States Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Games and Economic Behavior, volume 45, pages 465-487 (issn: 0899-8256,

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Authors: Yildiz, Muhamet;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.297168 , 10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00154-4

handle: 1721.1/64344

Walrasian Bargaining

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Abstract

Given any two-person economy, we consider a simple alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the agents offer prices. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all stationary subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the allocation) as the agents become infinitely patient. Therefore, price-taking behavior can be achieved with only two agents.

Country

United States

Related Organizations

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
United States

Keywords

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, Dynamic games, Stochastic games, stochastic differential games, bargaining, implementation, competitive equilibrium

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