Spanish Abstract: Las ciudades de Colombia mantienen indices altos de delito a pesar del aumento del gasto en defensa y seguridad. Este trabajo propone y analiza la provision de informacion como una estrategia de bajo costo que puede ser efectiva para la disuasion del crimen. Para mostrar su efectividad, desarrollamos un juego dinamico con informacion imperfecta entre Autoridad y Criminal. En este juego la Autoridad debe decidir si asignar o no un policia a un area determinada y si enviar o no una senal. Por su lado, el Criminal solo observa la senal y debe decidir si comete el crimen o no. Si decide cometerlo sera atrapado unicamente si un policia esta presente. Uno de los equilibrios muestra que el uso adecuado de la senal puede desincentivar el crimen a traves de una mayor percepcion de captura sin incurrir en altos costos como el incremento del pie de fuerza. English Abstract: Despite authorities’ increase in defense and security expenditure, cities in Colombia maintain high delinquency rates. This document proposes and analyzes the provision of information as a low cost strategy that could be effective in crime reduction. To show its effectiveness, we develop a dynamic game with imperfect information between an Authority and a potential Criminal. The Authority decides whether to assign a policeman or not and whether to send a signal or not. The Criminal only observes the signal and must decide whether to commit the crime or not. If he decides to commit the crime, he will be arrested only if there is a policeman. One of the equilibria shows that the adequate use of the signal can deter crime through a greater perception of capture without having to incur in high costs such as increasing the police manpower. We also relate equilibria to different stages of development.