
For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation-which we call enforceable dominance-is employed.
Coalition structure, Cooperative games, Core-extension, Coalition structure, core-extension, non-emptiness, dominance, Non-emptiness, Dominance, jel: jel:C71, jel: jel:C73
Coalition structure, Cooperative games, Core-extension, Coalition structure, core-extension, non-emptiness, dominance, Non-emptiness, Dominance, jel: jel:C71, jel: jel:C73
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