
AbstractI model the behavior of decision-makers seeking conformity and influence in a connected population. The model allows for one-sided linking, with information flowing from the target to the link’s originator. Conformity is achieved only with a social order, necessitating differentiated rewards despiteex antehomogeneity. The leader holds a strategic social locationex post, exerting influence independent of any leadership traits. A strong desire to influence produces non-conforming autonomous decision-makers. Socially detrimental multiple leaders can be sustained as well.
Noncooperative games, non-cooperative games, social networks, opinion leadership, Decision theory, Social networks; opinion dynamics, conformity
Noncooperative games, non-cooperative games, social networks, opinion leadership, Decision theory, Social networks; opinion dynamics, conformity
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