
handle: 10419/102324
Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may induce pleasure or pain depending on whether preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in which effort choices affect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert nests inequity aversion over money net of effort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share team output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium effort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social norms of cooperation.
desert, deservingness, equity, inequity aversion, loss aversion, reference-dependent preferences, guilt, reciprocity, social norms, team production, Justice, guilt, team production, inequity aversion, loss aversion, equity, reciprocity, Payment Methods, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, social norms, desert, Desert, Deservingness, Equity, Inequity aversion, Loss aversion, Reference-dependent preferences, Guilt, Reciprocity, Social norms, Team production, ddc:330, J33, deservingness, reference-dependent preferences, Inequality, J33 - Compensation Packages, D63 - Equity, D63, Desert, deservingness, equity, inequity aversion, loss aversion, reference-dependence preferences, guilt, reciprocity, social norms, team production, jel: jel:D63, jel: jel:J33
desert, deservingness, equity, inequity aversion, loss aversion, reference-dependent preferences, guilt, reciprocity, social norms, team production, Justice, guilt, team production, inequity aversion, loss aversion, equity, reciprocity, Payment Methods, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, social norms, desert, Desert, Deservingness, Equity, Inequity aversion, Loss aversion, Reference-dependent preferences, Guilt, Reciprocity, Social norms, Team production, ddc:330, J33, deservingness, reference-dependent preferences, Inequality, J33 - Compensation Packages, D63 - Equity, D63, Desert, deservingness, equity, inequity aversion, loss aversion, reference-dependence preferences, guilt, reciprocity, social norms, team production, jel: jel:D63, jel: jel:J33
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 37 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
